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I

Heavenly Father created a plan centered on giving everyone the opportunity to make choices and
allow individuals the greatest possible progress toward a fullness of joy, happiness, and love.

n his 2011 book Lost in Transition, sociologist Christian Smith investigates
the way “emerging adults” make sense of moral choices.1 Smith’s findings
are not encouraging: many emerging adults are unable to engage questions
about moral problems or dilemmas in a meaningful way and sometimes
seem unaware that they ever confront such dilemmas. Six out of ten emerging adults in the study believed that “morality is a personal choice, entirely a
matter of individual decision.”2 When asked to identify a moral dilemma they
had faced in recent years, 66 percent of emerging adults in this study either
could not think of anything or described dilemmas that are not moral—for
example, “simple household decisions, such as whether to buy a second cat
litter box.”3
Concerns about “moral relativism” are common from Church leaders.4
This is not surprising, given that the Church teaches that God is a God of
truth and law, and has prescribed certain rules about right and wrong. Elder
Dallin H. Oaks teaches, “We believe in absolute truth, including the existence
of God and the right and wrong established by His commandments. We know
that the existence of God and the existence of absolute truth are fundamental
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to life on this earth, whether they are believed in or not.”5 Other religious
leaders have voiced similar concerns about moral relativism. In a homily given
prior to the Conclave that elected him Pope Benedict XVI, Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger said that our society is “building a dictatorship of relativism that
does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists
solely of one’s own ego and desires.”6
For many people, the suggestion that there are real moral “truths” that
apply to everyone is almost incomprehensible and even dangerous. They
worry that those who believe in moral truth may want to “impose” their
personal values upon others. Better, on this alternative view, to not believe
in anything too strongly, so that others’ rights to freedom of thought and
individual choice can be respected. But can this alternative view make sense
of rights at all? Doesn’t the assertion of rights to freedom of thought and
individual choice unavoidably implicate the speaker in the existence of moral
truths? And if so, should these beliefs also be held lightly?
In this paper I hope to clarify some aspects of contemporary moral “relativism” as it manifests itself both in popular culture and in some influential
intellectual trends. What I hope to show is that what often passes as moral
relativism is not actually relativistic at all—those who assert or imply that
there is no moral truth are often strongly committed to a particular moral
vision, though they frequently try to avoid or downplay this fact. The combination of the appearance of moral relativism and strong moral conviction is
facilitated by a vocabulary of what I call “nonjudgmental” moral concepts—
concepts that mark off moral boundaries even as they advance skepticism
about the possibility of moral truth. I explain what nonjudgmental moral
concepts are, make some broad historical comments about how nonjudgmental moral concepts became prevalent, and show why we should be suspicious
of any moral claim that implies there is no moral truth.
Nonjudgmentalism’s Judgments

As Smith’s research shows, our culture is extremely confused about moral values. It’s not just that people disagree vehemently over what moral truth is,
but that they hold contradictory views about the existence of moral truth.
“Who are you to impose your private, personal values on others?” is a sentiment often expressed today. What is not often noticed is that this statement
includes two contradictory claims. One is that there are no moral truths that
apply to everyone. Particular individuals may believe that something is true,
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and it might even be “true for them,” but there are no moral truths that apply
to everyone. Morality is subjective and personal. But the same statement also
suggests that some things are true for everyone. The “who are you” part of
the statement necessarily implies a moral criticism that it is wrong to impose
values on other people, a criticism which the speaker apparently takes as true.
Thus, moral relativism and moral conviction are strangely expressed in the
same sentence.
This strange tension—of being generally skeptical toward moral truth,
but nonetheless needing it and relying on it anyway—has been facilitated by
the rise of what might be called “nonjudgmental” moral concepts: tolerance,
diversity, inclusion, authenticity, difference, neutrality, openness, nonconformity, multiculturalism, “otherness,” individualism, pluralism, freedom (in
the sense of what was once called “license”7), and autonomy.8 All of these
concepts place moral limits on what humans should do, but in doing so they
cut against the idea that there could be such a thing as moral truth. For example, we are sometimes told that tolerance is important because (among other
reasons) we could be wrong and others could be right. Therefore, we should
not judge. But if this is true, couldn’t we also be wrong about the value of
tolerance itself ? As Stanley Fish says in a related context, “Why should this
belief be exempt from the general skepticism it announces?”9 The same goes
for inclusion and diversity—one might think that these concepts require us
to put aside all judgment and standards so that everyone and everything can
be included. But what about people and ideas that are hostile to inclusion and
diversity? Should they also be included? (If they are, doesn’t that undercut
the very reason these values are attractive?) In essence, these concepts seek to
advance moral claims without committing to a moral foundation; they are
nonjudgmental moral values.
No single value better embodies the tension within nonjudgmental
moral concepts than the preeminent moral value of our time: individual
autonomy.10 To be autonomous in this sense is to be the author of one’s own
life and actions; to not be under the authority or dominion of any other person or group.11 The autonomous individual is (or aspires to be) liberated from
any unchosen obligations, identities, or roles. The autonomous individual
may follow moral norms, but only because that person has freely chosen them.
With roots in Immanuel Kant12 and elaborations in contemporary philosophers such as John Rawls,13 the autonomous individual both describes what
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many people think is most important about human beings and prescribes
how humans ought to be treated.
One might think that because each autonomous individual is sovereign
over the moral norms that govern his or her life, there could be no general
account of morality—a general account, after all, would presuppose some
source of moral value outside and above the autonomous individual; indeed,
would suggest that particular autonomous individuals could “get it wrong.”
Theorists of autonomy finesse this tension by noting that being autonomous
is a matter of degree,14 presupposing an idealized account of the autonomous
individual—what an autonomous individual could and should be, if that individual were fully living up to his or her autonomous capacities. Here again, we
see the strange dance between affirming and denying the possibility of moral
truth. On one hand, proponents of autonomy claim that what is most important about human beings is their capacity to choose and define the moral
boundaries that govern their lives, to be free from external constraints and
norms; on the other hand, the very act of identifying these characteristics as
morally relevant stakes a claim about how humans ought to be treated, constraining the law that one can give oneself.
Placing autonomy at the center of the moral universe has implications
for the way we understand other values. With autonomy on the throne, neutrality also becomes important. Because each individual is (or should be) the
ultimate author and evaluator of her choices and lifestyle, no one else is in
a position to say that what she has chosen is wrong (or right). There is an
important sense in which proponents of autonomy are committed to never
answering the question of what constitutes a morally good life (in philosophical jargon, this view is known as “antiperfectionism”15). Though particular
individuals may derive satisfaction from certain choices or lifestyles, there is
nothing general that can be said about what contributes to or detracts from a
morally good life. Some people may choose to work as doctors, others devote
themselves to religion, others spend time in the outdoors, others consume
pornography,16 others raise children, and others count blades of grass.17 The
state and individuals must be neutral with respect to other people’s decisions
about what constitutes a good life.
Second, though general statements about the good life are presumptively invalid, we do know that people will need resources to pursue the
ends they happen to have. As an emphasis about the good life dwindles
away, the importance of all-purpose means of pursuing what one wants
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becomes important—things such as power, money, prestige, self-respect,
social approval, and so on. Note the “nonjudgmental” character of these
goods—they are instrumental in allowing people to pursue their aims, whatever those aims happen to be. Facilitating people’s capacity to choose, rather
than encouraging them to make any particular choice, becomes a key goal.
There is also a bias toward distributing such goods “equally,” because few other
standards for evaluating distributions seem to be available.18 John Rawls, the
most influential political philosopher of the twentieth century, believes that
all such goods should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
would benefit the least well off.19 Many other political theorists adopt the
general commitment to equality, though the precise justification for this
seems elusive.20
Autonomy, then, sums up the central contradiction of nonjudgmental
moral values: humans are important because they are free, with “free” meaning
unconstrained by any higher law or power, unencumbered by any unchosen
values or roles.21 The core of the moral outlook that motivates many people
who use the vocabulary of nonjudgmental moral concepts has been summarized nicely by Christian Smith: it is “realizing the emancipation, equality,
and moral affirmation of all human beings as autonomous, self-directing,
individual agents (who should be) out to live their lives as they personally
so desire, by constructing their own favored identities, entering and exiting
relationships as they choose, and equally enjoying the gratification of experiential, material, and bodily pleasures.”22 Strangely, this moral approach seems
to require us to place our trust in the absence of truth, as David Bently Hart
provocatively argues:
Modernity’s highest ideal—its special understanding of personal autonomy—
requires us to place our trust in an original absence underlying all of reality, a fertile
void in which all things are possible, from which arises no impediment to our wills,
and before which we may consequently choose to make of ourselves what we choose.
We trust, that is to say, that there is no substantial criterion by which to judge our
choices that stands higher than the unquestioned good of free choice itself, and that
therefore all judgment, divine no less than human, is in some sense an infringement
upon our freedom.23

The irony, of course, is that even though people in our society often talk
as if we do not believe in moral truth, we can never quite kick the habit—we
never stop believing that (at least some) moral truths apply to everyone, such
as that people’s autonomy ought to be respected and protected. So we settle
for rhetoric which suggests there is no moral truth while we go on indulging
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our habit for moral objectivity. This leads to an important point: though
there is tension within nonjudgmental values between affirming and denying
moral truth, this tension is very rhetorically useful in debates about morality. One can employ the skeptical aspect of a nonjudgmental moral concept
(“don’t impose your personal values on others,” “be more tolerant, open . . .”)
to fend off rival moral views that advance truth claims. Once these have been
branded as presumptively invalid for making truth claims at all (note that
moral positions are often not even engaged; they are simply dismissed for
being too “judgmental”), one can advance one’s own moral claims as the only
possible and reasonable ones, all the while claiming to be “open to further
discussion,” lest someone think that the speaker has actually adopted a truth
claim. But, inasmuch as we make any moral claim at all (and nonjudgmental moral concepts undeniably make them), we must recognize that we treat
these ideas as morally true. As Steven D. Smith says, “We cannot actually be
neutral. But we can pretend—even or especially to ourselves—that we are.”24
The Rise of Nonjudgmentalism

How did we get here? Moral reasoning in the United States has not always
relied so heavily on nonjudgmental moral concepts as it does today. The
“background”25 set of understandings our culture holds about morality has
shifted, placing a premium on individual autonomy and inculcating a general
prejudice against authority of almost any kind. A comprehensive treatment
of “how we got here” would take several books to tell26 (if it can be fully told
at all27), and I will not attempt anything like a comprehensive treatment.
However, I will sketch out a few trends and events which I believe are relevant, with the caveat that much more could be said about each (and I hope
to say more in future writings). They are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
and other factors are surely relevant. I should also note that I do not think
these developments are all or even mostly bad; some of them are, in fact, quite
good. However, I do believe they have had the effect of making our thinking
on moral topics less coherent, and this is a regrettable outcome.
The first, and probably most important, is the rise and dominance of
scientific naturalism as a means of making sense of the world. Scientific naturalism begins from the premise that what is “real” can be investigated through
the use of the senses (and instruments that augment human perception). The
entities that science investigates can be observed, measured, quantified, and, in
the ideal case, manipulated under controlled conditions to better understand
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their properties and underlying causal mechanisms (or probabilistic tendencies). I hardly need to say that the success of the natural sciences over the
past several centuries has been phenomenal: science has allowed humans to
understand, predict, control, and manipulate the physical world to an extent
that would have been unbelievable to humans living long ago.
The assumptions and expectations of scientific naturalism have led to a
general conceptual division between “facts,” which are allegedly objective and
real, and “values,” which, because they do not conform to the expectations
of scientific naturalism, are seen as subjective and not truly capable of being
established by “reason.” We should note that for quite some time, people who
practiced empirical science also believed in moral and religious truths (and
understood themselves to believe in such truths),28 and many still do. And
it is important to emphasize that nothing in the scientific approach requires
one to believe that there are no moral truths; one can believe that science is
a useful approach to investigating many aspects of the “real” world but still
believe that some “real” things elude its grasp. However, the lesson that many
people influenced by scientific thinking have taken is that only entities that
offer themselves up for scientific investigation can be counted as fully real.
“Metaphysical” concepts such as justice and morality (and worse, God) are
sometimes seen as “pseudo-concepts” or even “nonsense,”29 for there is nothing in the material world that is the direct, empirically verifiable referent of
these terms. There have been philosophical advocates of this position, but the
influence of scientific thinking seems to be more diffuse and pervasive. Even
those who are not familiar with the academic philosophical debates have
come to have new background expectations about what constitutes “knowledge,” about what kind of evidence is necessary to establish a claim, about the
distinction between (objective) facts and (subjective) values, and so on.
In the United States, the full implications of scientific naturalism for the
study of human phenomena arrived in the early twentieth century. At that
time, disciplinary boundaries such as sociology, political science, economics, and psychology had formed within universities. Many of these relatively
new disciplines were fighting for recognition (and funding) within universities,30 and they turned to scientific thinking and categories for legitimacy.
Many people who adopted the empirical scientific approach also embraced
the view that there are no moral truths. Edward Purcell writes: “A sweeping
ethical relativism was implicit in the basic assumptions of most social science
thought throughout the twenties and early thirties. . . . Without a basis in the
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supernatural, in revealed religion, or in a rationally authoritative philosophy,
value systems could only be the products of social, economic, and psychological pressures operating on individuals and groups. As such, no values could be
called ‘higher’ in any meaningful sense.”31
A second development that has led to the proliferation of nonjudgmental
moral concepts is the United States’ encounter with totalitarianism in World
War II and the Cold War. Just as moral relativism was becoming something
of an establishment view within the social sciences in the early twentieth century, fascist and communist regimes required Americans to reevaluate how
“relativist” they really were. As the horrors of the Holocaust and World War
II unfolded, American intellectuals had to ask themselves the following questions: Is there really no sense in which we can say we are morally superior to
Nazi Germany and other totalitarian regimes? Is Hitler simply one more politician, albeit one who uses power in unconventional ways? Is it really the case
that there are no moral truths, thus no moral grounds on which to criticize
the actions of totalitarian governments?
Some intellectuals, such as University of Chicago president Robert
Maynard Hutchins, consciously rejected the relativistic tendencies of scientific naturalism and sought to ground a theory of absolute truth based on
a rational grasp of ethical and political principles. Hutchins believed that a
proper grasp of metaphysics, grounded in Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, would provide a way to assess the meaning and importance of different
fields of inquiry by providing “a hierarchy of truths which shows us which
are fundamental and which subsidiary, which significant and which not.”32
Hutchins believed that only an ordering principle that rose above empirical
scientific research could provide grounds on which to claim that totalitarianism was wrong and democracy was right. Indeed, he went so far as to say that
that there was no real difference between the ethical relativism that characterized American academic life and Nazi principles: “There is little to choose
between the doctrine I learned in an American law school [Yale] and that
which Hitler proclaims.”33 In Hutchins’s view, ethical relativism led directly
to totalitarianism.
Most American intellectuals rejected this approach and sought for a way
to reconcile their broadly naturalistic approach to the world with the view
that America was superior to the totalitarian regimes. The solution is what
Edward Purcell calls the “relativist theory of democracy.” Led by John Dewey,
who had been arguing this viewpoint for some time, proponents of this view
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argued that what truly made America different and better than the totalitarian
regimes was its open and tolerant character. Unlike the totalitarian regimes,
which have a strong view of what is “true” and then coercively impose that
view on society, American democracy is always changing, always evolving,
always learning from new and diverse perspectives. Dewey argued that any
hierarchical system of values, such as that proposed by Hutchins, necessarily
implied an elite who could implement it correctly in society.34 Hierarchical
systems of knowledge were fitted for a feudal society in which the few exercise power over the many, whereas nonhierarchical systems were appropriate
for democracy, in which there is no official ruling class and no official creed.
As David Ciepley writes, “What appealed to scientific naturalists about such
a definition is that it allowed them to condemn totalitarianism, and praise
democracy, without taking any ‘substantive’ value stance . . . If totalitarianism
stands for value absolutism, then democracy is the social form that results
from accepting the relativity of all value positions and is characterized by pluralism, change, voluntarism, and compromise.”35 On this view, the true danger
was not from those who did not believe in moral truths, it comes from those
who do. Hitler, after all, believed he had found the truth. In this way, proponents of the relativist theory of democracy turned the tables on Hutchins and
his like, arguing that they were the true totalitarians.36
In the court of history, the relativist theory of democracy seems to have
won out. American democracy was defined not by any substantive values it
held, but rather by its resolute determination to not own up to substantive
values. In 1943 the US Supreme Court articulated this view in a succinct and
famous way: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.”37 This sentence is one of the most repeated
and celebrated in the Supreme Court’s history, but it is also, as Steven D.
Smith points out, “flatly false, not to mention incoherent . . . government
officials both ‘high’ . . . and ‘petty’ . . . every day prescribe what shall be orthodox (or, in other words, correct opinion or teaching)”38 in all sorts of matters.
And how could it be otherwise? Inasmuch as social life is orderly, there will
have to be some ideas and projects that are taken more seriously than others. When the state exercises coercive powers, as it always does in some form,
that power will be brought to bear on behalf of certain ideas and against others. Our moral judgments cannot be up in the air all of the time; there are
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decisions to be made, and they will be made for reasons. Those reasons are
treated as true, even if those who act on them profess (often unconvincingly)
that they are open to revising them in the future.
The third major development that has strengthened the place of nonjudgmental moral concepts in American society is consumerism. Consumerism as
a mass cultural phenomenon seems to have become commonplace in America
around the turn of the twentieth century39 and then became more entrenched
and prevalent after World War II with advances in communication technology and the affluence of the postwar era. Though there is much to criticize in
consumerism, for our purposes the most important aspects of consumerism
are the “values” it promotes. Advertising campaigns seek to convince people
that their true happiness consists in a life of comfort, convenience, self-fulfillment, and vivid experience,40 all of which could be bought with new (and
ever changing) consumer goods and services. As Christopher Lasch observes,
“Advertising serves not so much to advertise products as to promote consumption as a way of life. It ‘educates’ the masses into an unappeasable appetite not
only for goods but for new experiences and personal fulfillment. It upholds
consumption as the answer to the age-old discontents of loneliness, sickness,
weariness, lack of sexual satisfaction; at the same time, it creates new forms
of discontent peculiar to the modern age.”41 Crucial to this set of messages is
that there should be nothing that prevents me from achieving my desires and
finding satisfaction, “the child-in-the-candy-store feeling of hovering alongside a limitless field of pleasurable options.”42
Advertising generally does not seek to persuade potential customers by
explaining, with reasons, the virtues of what is being sold. Rather, advertising
seeks to bypass customers’ conscious minds and create a sense of fascination
with a brand or idea. Advertising succeeds when it creates unconscious (and
unwarranted) associations between a brand and happiness, beauty, success,
security, empowerment, self-confidence, excitement, novelty, community,
self-fulfillment, competence, contentment, authenticity, and good taste. Of
course, when you buy a bottle of Coca-Cola you do not actually “open happiness,” as their advertising campaign would have you believe. All you get is
a sugary, carbonated, caffeinated drink—nothing more. Many marketers are
upfront about the nonrational goals of their profession: former Saatchi and
Saatchi CEO Kevin Roberts says that the goal of advertising should be to
create “Loyalty Beyond Reason” and imbue brands with “mystery, sensuality,
and intimacy.”43 A new pair of shoes or a new car will not bring you lasting
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happiness,44 but we are constantly bombarded with images seeking to convince us that our entire happiness depends upon consuming what is for sale.
Consumerism therefore supports nonjudgmental moral concepts in
complex ways. Consumerism is “nonjudgmental” in the sense that it discourages critical thinking in general; advertising does not encourage rational
reflection but rather bypasses it with appeals to non-rational and sub-rational
motivations. The ideal consumers, from the perspective of those who advance
consumerism, are those who do not think hard about consumption choices
but merely purchase. Consumerism also encourages us to be “open”—open,
of course, to new consumer products. Any “rigid” belief, identity, or tradition
(i.e., any belief, identity, or tradition not yet colonized by consumerism) that
might make people less likely believe their happiness consists in consumption
is an obstacle to consumerism.45 Moral character and self-discipline—particularly if these might lead people to delay acting on their desires or feel guilty
for doing so—have to be broken down in favor of a more open, tolerant, and
cosmopolitan personality. The nonjudgmental values we live with today have
an uncanny affinity with the kind of character traits consumerism has a vested
interest in promoting: openness (try our new product), tolerance (don’t be
too set in your own ways; be open to change and different perspectives/ideas/
products), and authenticity (find your true self—by consuming our products). It may be impossible to state precisely how a culture of consumption
makes certain moral concepts seem more plausible, but the affinity seems too
striking to be accidental or inconsequential.
The fourth factor that has led to the ascendance of nonjudgmental moral
concepts is the general acceptance of psychotherapeutic, or simply “therapeutic,” thinking to make sense of human life and choices. Alasdair MacIntyre
argues that in a world “after virtue,” after the breakdown of any shared consensus over moral truth (or even what it would mean to arrive at moral truth),
the therapist becomes a key figure of social life. Like the bureaucratic manager, who is interested only in finding effective means to reach given ends,
the therapist “treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is also
with technique, with effectiveness in transforming neurotic symptoms into
directed energy, maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted ones.”46 With a
few exceptions,47 most therapeutic thinking does not have an explicit moral
goal. Rather, the goal of most therapy is to remove impediments to people’s
functionality and ability to reach their goals. Therapeutic thinking is selfconsciously nonjudgmental, replacing words such as “good” and “bad” with
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“healthy” and “unhealthy” and urging people to find “what works for you.” As
traditional forms of community and morality have faded in relevance, the
need to look inside for answers has intensified: “When so little can be taken
for granted, and when the meaningfulness of social existence no longer grants
an inner life at peace with itself, every man must become something of a
genius about himself.”48
The nonjudgmentalism of therapeutic thinking is perhaps nowhere better expressed than in the humanistic psychology that arose after World War
II. Abraham Maslow, a major figure in the movement, said that each individual has a deep need and drive for “self-actualization,” or “the desire to
become more and more what one idiosyncratically is, to become everything
that one is capable of becoming.”49 Maslow also spoke favorably of “the total
collapse of all sources of value outside the individual.”50 Carl Rogers, another
major figure, advocated “client-centered therapy,” in which the therapist seeks
to “perceive the world as the client sees it, to perceive the client himself as
he is seen by himself, to lay aside all perceptions from the external frame of
reference while doing so, and to communicate something of this empathic
understanding to the client.”51 The premise of his approach is that when people are truly heard and treated with “unconditional positive regard,” they can
see the truth of their own situation and solve their own problems. A condition of the possibility of this working is that the therapist or counselor refrain
from any judgment, positive or negative, of what the client says or feels.52
Therapeutic thinking has expanded far beyond the confines of the professional practices of psychologists and other mental health professionals.
Where people once turned to family, religion, and other sources for emotional support and guidance for making choices, people now turn more and
more to therapists and therapeutic ideas. Books with titles such as In Therapy
We Trust53 and One Nation Under Therapy54 highlight the ways that our society has put its faith in therapy as the answer to our practical and existential
questions. Therapeutic thinking has “triumphed” in our time,55 becoming the
default approach to addressing questions about how we ought to live. And,
so long as people have high self-esteem and can reach their goals, therapeutic
thinking generally tries to be nonjudgmental about how people live their lives.
This is a good place to reiterate that I do not think the changes I have
described are all bad. I am certain that therapeutic ideas have benefited many
people, including myself, and science has increased many people’s quality of
life immeasurably. But despite the obvious virtues of many of the changes I

Nonjudgmentalism Strikes Back: Moral Relativism and Conviction

65

have described, I still think they contributed to our current state of moral
incoherence. There may be something to put against that incoherence, but it
still is what it is, and we need to recognize it as such.
Concerns with Believing in Moral Truth

Some people may worry that if we acknowledge the existence of moral truth,
we will thereby be committed to establishing a totalitarian government which
stifles all dissent and forces everyone to believe what “we” believe the truth to
be. This sort of all-or-nothing thinking —either moral relativism on the one
hand, or repressive totalitarianism on the other—blinds us to feasible options
and the way we actually think. There is no way to make it through life without
thinking (or acting as if ) at least some things are morally true. We are confronted by unavoidable moral dilemmas: How should we live? How should
we exercise influence (in the form of joining or supporting social groups or
institutions, spending money, criticizing or praising the actions of others, and
so forth)? And, most importantly, how should we employ the awful coercive
power of the state (if we use it at all)? Regardless of what we think about
terms such as “truth,” “objective truth,” or “absolute truth,” the moral beliefs
we live by are true enough to structure our lives around and even, in certain
cases, to use coercive force to defend or advance. (And those who think the
use of coercive force is always wrong are some of the strongest believers in
moral truth, as only such a belief could compel someone to stand back and do
nothing while those one loves are killed.) As Michael Sandel notes, “For all
our uncertainties about ultimate questions of political philosophy—of justice
and value and the nature of the good life—the one thing we know is that we
live some answer all the time.”56 Further, it doesn’t seem to help matters much
to deny we believe our reasons are true. Imagine saying to a man put in jail
for some infraction, “Don’t worry—we don’t actually believe in moral truth
in this country!” If it is true enough to lock up a man for life or to use lethal
police or military force to defend, it is true for literally all practical purposes.
And believing in moral truth does not require that we “impose” all of
our beliefs on others. I believe people ought to be grateful, but I would
strongly resist a law that tried to coerce gratitude from the ungrateful. That
something is morally true, by itself, is not enough to force others to do it.57
Considerations of feasibility, effectiveness, and a due respect for individual
conscience will weigh against using coercive force in many circumstances.
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When pressed, some people who initially deny believing in moral truth
will eventually confess to believing in some moral truths, such as that slavery
or the Holocaust are wrong. (Those who do this sometimes appear to feel
compromised, as if having moral beliefs is a dirty little secret that one would
rather pretend is not there, but which one will admit to if it can no longer be
plausibly denied). They then fall back on some version of John Stuart Mill’s
“harm principle:” that people should be able to do whatever they want so long
as they do not harm other people.58 This sounds simple enough, but it turns
out that “harm” is actually quite difficult to get clear on. Evidence of this fact
is Joel Fienberg’s four-volume opus on the harm principle, the existence of
which is a testament to just how complicated “harm” can be.59 Take simply
one contemporary dispute: if a Christian baker does not want to bake a cake
for a same-sex wedding, how do we evaluate and weigh the harms done?60
What is the precise harm suffered by the gay couple for not being able to buy
a cake from that baker (presumably, it is beyond simply not getting the cake)?
If the baker is forced to bake the cake, is she harmed for having to violate her
conscience? Does it matter if the bakery is for-profit or non-profit (or religious)? Does it matter if there are other bakers within a reasonable distance
that are willing to bake the cake? Does it matter if the bakery is willing to sell
other goods to the gay couple, just not a wedding cake? Steven D. Smith has
persuasively argued that the harm principle is a “receptive vessel into which
advocates can pour virtually any content they like,”61 meaning that the real
work in moral disputes will be done by some set of background assumptions
about what constitutes “harm” rather than by commonsensical notions of
what harm is.
Proponents of autonomy might concede that, in some cases, some people will be imposed upon so that autonomy may be protected and promoted,
but they may respond that autonomy doesn’t impose moral values on people
as much as other moral theories do, and thus it is superior. In other words, it
does the least amount of imposing, and this makes it the best. But this line
of thought is mistaken—the amount of “imposing” that needs to be done is
entirely a matter of what the moral truth is and what moral wrongs need to be
righted. When I hear this argument, I think of a conversation I once had with
a friend. He said that what made John Locke’s political theory so great is that
his list of rights is so short: only life, liberty, and property. After we talked I
had the thought: if having a short list is a good thing, we could make Locke’s
list even shorter—just take off one of the rights! But, presumably, what makes
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Locke’s list good is that it is short without leaving off anything essential, which
means shortness, by itself, is not a virtue of lists of rights. The same point
applies to moral reasoning generally: we ought to believe in all moral truths—
no more, no less.
Conclusion: If You Don’t Believe in Moral Truth, Why Are You So Upset
about Injustice?

I should be clear that in this essay I am not actually defending a theory of
moral truth. What I am trying to do is demonstrate that, despite what many
people say or imply these days, almost everyone believes in moral truth. More
specifically, in this paper I hope to blunt the rhetorical force of statements
which imply that the problem is belief in moral truth. Religious people in
particular seem to be the targets of such rhetoric62 because religions are generally committed to something (i.e., some doctrine, belief, or orthodoxy), and it
is precisely this commitment to something that offends the autonomous aspiration to be perpetually free, open, and unlimited by any unchosen “truths.”
Too often, religious people let the implicit self-contradictions and evasions
of nonjudgmental moral concepts go unchallenged. Though I do not believe
that those who use nonjudgmental moral concepts do so in bad faith,63 it is
still the case that those who use such concepts do get an immense (and undeserved) amount of mileage out of asserting that we should just be more “open,”
“tolerant,” and respect other people’s “autonomy,” as if moral belief itself ought
to be reduced to a minimum (and perhaps eliminated). But it is only moral
belief which could motivate this project in the first place, so moral beliefs
can’t be the problem.
Though the phrase “nonjudgmental moral concepts” serves as a useful
label for the ideas I have been discussing, it turns out to be a contradiction
in terms. All moral concepts mark off boundaries between right and wrong,
good and bad (or their equivalents). Once one is committed to a moral belief,
the real discussion focuses not on whether there is moral truth, but what the
content of moral truth is. My plea is that we drop the charade and acknowledge that we’re engaged in the same pursuit of trying to get clear on moral
truth. There will be moral values that we live by and enforce, and the only real
question is: which moral values will they be? My answer is simple: we ought
to live by the true ones.
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